Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

State of Utah v. Steven Manchester : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christine F. Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Dee W. Smith; The Public Defender Association, Inc. of Weber County; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Manchester, No. 20030283 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4277

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
STEVEN MANCHESTER,

Case No. 20030283-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal From Convictionsfor Forgery, a Third Degree Felony, in Violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003), and Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, in
Violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003), in the Second Judicial
District Court, Weber County, Utah, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon,
Presiding

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS [3039]
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF [4666]
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

DEE W. SMITH
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC.
OF WEBER COUNTY
2568 Washington Blvd. Suite 200
Ogden,UT 84401

Brenda Beaton
Deputy Weber County Attorney

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COUR"

MAR 1 2 2004

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

STEVEN MANCHESTER,

CaseNo.20030283-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal From Convictions for Forgery, a Third Degree Felony, in Violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003), and Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, in
Violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003), in the Second Judicial
District Court, Weber County, Utah, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon,
Presiding

DEE W. SMITH
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC.
OF WEBER COUNTY
2568 Washington Blvd. Suite 200
Ogden,UT 84401
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS [3039]
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF [4666]
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Brenda Beaton
Deputy Weber County Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT
UTAH PRECEDENT AND RULES GRANT A TRIAL COURT DISCRETION
TO PERMIT WRITTEN QUESTIONS BY JURORS

9

(A) The Merits Should Not Be Considered Because Defendant Has Failed to Meet
Preservation and Rule 24 Briefing Requirements
10
(B) Defendant Has Not Established Any Basis to Questions the Soundness of
Utah Precedent and Rule Which Permit Questions by Jurors
CONCLUSION

15
19

ADDENDA
Addendum A - UTAH R. APP. P. 24
UTAH R. CIV. P. 47
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17

Addendum B - Ruling
Addendum C - Moore Questioning
Addendum D - Reaves Questioning

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.),
cert, denied, AAA MS. 826(1979)

15, 17

STATE CASES
Carter v. State, 234 N.E.2d 650 (Ind. 1968)

17

Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App. 379, 80 P.3d 546

11

State v.Anderson, 158P.2d 127 (Utah 1945)
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993)
State v. Culkin, 35 P.3d 233 (Haw. 2001)
State v. Doleszny, 2004 VT 9
State v. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d 222 (Ohio 2003)
State v. Hays, 883 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1994)
State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989)

9, 13, 17, 18
10
15, 16, 17
16, 17
15, 16, 17
17
9, 13, 15, 18

State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92

4, 5, 6, 7

State v. Martinez, 326 P.2d 102 (Utah 1958)

9, 13, 16, 18

State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, 67 P.3d 477

2, 13

State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994),
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995)
State v. Milligan, 11 P.3d 771
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992)
State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App. 8, 84 P.3d 841
State v. Richins, 2004 UT App. 36, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 26
ii

2, 13
15, 17
2, 11
14
2, 10

State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998)

11

Yeager v. Greene, 502 A.2d 980 (D.C. 1985)

16

STATE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003)

1

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (2003)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2002)

1

UTAH R. APP. P. 24

2,10, 11, 13

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 47

8,9,13,18

UTAH

R. CRIM. P. 17

passim

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintijj. AppcJee,

Case No. 20030283-CA

STEVEN MANCHESTER,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL ST A i I MINT
Defendant appeals from his convict ions lor tornery, a ilv-rd degree felony, in violation
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 (2003), and theft, a class A misdemeanor, i; violation . i
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-404 (2003). This Court has jurisdiction pui

;

ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
'>!<?"

-

.»

.

-

of the trial court. SeeBrvW"of 'Appellant !Pr -ip't. J //17-18. Nevertheless, he asks the Court
to overrule this authority. Sec id. at /v. i he issue on appeal is:
Has defendant cumed ;..o ouiucn 10 csta;. lt h that Utah prec^uciii \\ iiici. jKMiiiis
questions by jurors violates due process and, therefore, must be overruled?

The party seeking to overturn precedent carries a '"substantial burden of persuasion'
due to 'the doctrine of stare decisis.'" State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, Tf 11, 67 P.3d 477
(quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115
(1995)). Here, the Court need not reach the merits because the due process claim was not
preserved below and is not properly presented on appeal. See State v. Richins, 2004 UT App
36, If 8, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (reaffirming preservation requirement); State v. Price, 827
P.2d 247,249-50 (Utah App. 1992) (explaining briefing requirements of rule 24, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Defendant seeks to overturn case precedent, but fails to acknowledge rule 17(i), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted in 2002, which reads:
Questions by jurors, A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to
a witness as provided in this section.
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall
control the process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder
of fact and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow
any question from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any
time.
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should
advise the jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them and
submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should
advise the jurors that some questions might not be allowed.
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and
unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge
may disallow a question even though no objection is made. The judge shall
preserve the written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the
judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask
it. The question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow
counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's
question.
2

The full text of rule 17 and other cited rules is attached in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with forgery and theft (R. 1, 58-59). On January 8, 2003, a
jury trial was held (R. 54-55). During the course of the trial, jurors submitted in writing two
questions they wished the victim to be asked (Rl 53:133-34). The court discussed the matter
with counsel in chambers (R153: 133-37). See Addendum B (Ruling). Defense counsel
objected to the questions, claiming that any questions by jurors impinged on a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by potentially interfering with a chosen trial strategy, and
that the questions posed in this case were irrelevant and had been asked and answered (Rl 53:
133-34). The court overruled the objections. The court concluded that questions by jurors
were legally permissible in the court's discretion and that, in this case, the questions would
clarify apparent jury confusion (R153: 133-37, 191). See Add. B. The court further ruled
that the victim should be recalled by the prosecutor and the two jury questions posed. The
prosecutor could then ask follow-up questions and defense counsel could cross-examine
(R153: 136-37). See Add. B. Defense counsel did not object to this procedure. The victim
was recalled, responded to the questions and a few follow-up questions, and was crossexamined (R139: 140-46). See Addendum C (Moore Questioning).
Later, when the investigating detective testified, jurors again submitted two written
questions (Rl 53: 191 & 194). After unrecorded bench conferences, the court reminded the
jury of previous testimony in response to one question and allowed the prosecutor to pose the
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other question to the detective, after which defense counsel cross-examined (Rl 53:191 -205).
See Addendum D (Reaves Questioning). There are no recorded objections to either question.
The jury convicted defendant of forgery and theft (R. 106-07; R153: 243-50). In a
separate proceeding, the jury found that defendant had twice before been convicted of theft,
which permitted enhancement of the class A misdemeanor to a felony (Rl 53: 244-50). The
court subsequently ruled that the certified copy of one of the prior judgments was not
admissible because it was not properly signed and struck the felony enhancement (R152: 34). On March 6, 2003, defendant was sentenced to the statutory term of zero-to-five years
imprisonment on the forgery conviction and a concurrent one year term on the theft
conviction (R. 127-28, 141-42; R152: 9-10). On April 3, 2003, defendant timely appeal (R
130, 133, 139-40).
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
Tom Moore felt sorry for defendant and his pregnant girlfriend and wanted to help
them. He let them move into his home on March 1,2002 (Rl 53: 64-67). On April 23,2002,
defendant stole $825.00 of Tom's money (R153: 67, 76-77, 82-83).
# * *

Tom, his girlfriend, Ora, and a friend, Edith, lived in his Ogden home (R153: 64).
Tom did not know defendant or his girlfriend, but learned though a mutual friend that they
needed a place to live and said they could move into his home temporarily (R153: 65).

]

The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the verdict and rulings. See
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 2, 12 P.3d 92.
4

Tom needed to refinance his mortgage (R153: 67-68). Defendant told him about a
Canadian loan company listed in the back of a business magazine (Rl 53: 67). Tom decided
to apply for a $10,000.00 consolidation loan, but let defendant arrange it (R153: 68-69, 74).
Defendant spoke to Rose Powers, one of the company's loan officers, and later told Tom that
the company needed $825.00 as a down payment (R153: 68, 78, 142). Tom borrowed the
down payment from Edith (R153: 68-69).2
On April 23, 2002, Tom and defendant went to a Western Union outlet at a local
grocery store to transfer the $825.00 down payment to Canada (R153: 69-75). Defendant
filled out the necessary documents, including signing Tom's name to the "sending money"
authorization (id.). Tom thought this was "a little strange," but was not concerned because
his own handwriting was sloppy (R153: 70 & 91). Tom paid Western Union the $825.00
plus what he thought was a $67.00 wire transfer fee and received a receipt in return (id.). The
transfer fee was actually $65.00. The extra two dollars were a result of defendant adding a

2

The jurors submitted two written questions for Tom (R153: 133). The first
question related to his need for the loan and read: "I don't know if it's relevant, but Mr.
Tom—I'm confused why he would agree to go in the first place to send the down
payment and still have to borrow money" (R153: 133). After the court ruled the question
was permissible, Tom was recalled to the stand (R153: 139). The prosecutor identified
the question as a juror's and asked: " T m confused, why would you agree to go in the
first place,' I'm assuming to the Western Union, 'but you still had to borrow money'"
(R153: 143). Tom responded that he wanted the debt consolidation loan to refinance his
home at a lower interest rate and to pay off some bills (R153: 143-44). He explained that
he borrowed the loan down payment from Edith, but planned on paying her back from the
loan proceeds (id.). The prosecutor asked why he needed to borrow the down payment
and Tom explained that his mortgage payments were $750.00 and increasing to $850.00,
which he could not afford (R153: 144). Edith offered to help because she also wanted
lower expenses (R153: 144-45). Tom still owed Edith the money (R153: 145).
5

test question and answer to the Western Union forms, which served as a security code and
permitted anyone with the test answer and the Western Union receipt to access the funds
(R153: 100-03, 128-29).
The two returned to Tom's house and Tom placed the Western Union receipt on the
kitchen counter (R153: 76). Later that afternoon, defendant and his girlfriend left Tom's
house (Rl 53:76-77). Tom assumed they were visiting friends because they left their clothes
and cat behind, but they never returned (id.).
A few days later, Tom spoke to Ms. Powers, the loan officer, on the telephone and
was told the down payment had not been received (Rl 53:77-79).3 He looked for his Western
Union receipt, but it was missing (Rl 53: 81 -82). Tom contacted Western Union and was told
that five hours after the original transaction, they issued a full refund. Western Union had
not required identification for the refund because the man seeking it knew the test answer and
had the Western Union receipt (R153: 77-80, 106, 148-55). The man signed "Tom Moore"
on the $825.00 refund check (R153: 131-32, 154-55).
Tom located defendant (R153: 82). Defendant tearfully confessed that he had taken
the money, said he was sorry, and promised to repay Tom (R153: 83). Over the next three

3

The second juror question for Tom was, "Does the loan exist in Canada?" (R153:
133). The prosecutor told Tom that the jury wanted to know: "Does the loan officer exist
in Canada?" (R153: 140). Tom explained that defendant made all the loan arrangements,
but told him the loan officer's name was Rose Powers (R153: 140-42). Afer Tom became
suspicious, he called the company and spoke to Ms. Powers, who told him the company
never received the money (id.).
6

weeks, Tom spoke to defendant several times and each time defendant promised to repay
him, but never did (R153: 83-84). On May 13, Tom called the police (R153: 160).
Eyewitness identification by the Western Union employee confirmed that defendant
took Tom's Western Union receipt, returned to Western Union, showed the receipt, knew the
test question answer, and, without any other identification, obtained a refund check (R153:
107-12, 116-21, 159-171, 188-93). Defendant then forged Tom's name as the endorser on
the check and received $825.00 in cash (id.).4
When confronted by the police, defendant fully confessed (R153: 171-88).5
At trial, defendant did not testify or present witnesses (R153: 205). In closing, his
counsel argued that the loan company might not exist and Tom Moore was not believable
(R153: 234-36). The jury convicted defendant of forgery and theft (R. 106).

4

A juror asked in writing, "How did defendant manage to cash the check without
Tom Moore's identification?" (R153: 194). After an unrecorded sidebar conference, the
court reminded the jury of previous testimony which established that a refund could be
obtained without personal identification if a person had the original Western Union
receipt and knew the answer to the test question (R153: 194).
5

A juror asked in writing: "If forgery was involved, why didn't Detective Reaves
question the Western Union signature" (R153: 191). When the prosecutor posed the
question to the detective, he did not understand which signature the jury was referring to
until the prosecutor explained that the jury wanted to know why he did not ask defendant
if he had signed the refund request form (R153: 192). The detective explained that given
the passage of time since the interview, he was not absolutely sure whether they discussed
the refund request form in light of defendant's admissions that he forged the endorsement
on the refund check and stole the money (R153: 192-93). The detective viewed the
forged endorsement as more significant than the refund form because without the
endorsement, the refund check could not have been cashed (id.)
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For over one hundred years, American courts have allowed questions by jurors.
Today, almost every federal circuit and the vast majority of state jurisdictions permit the
practice. Utah is no exception. In 1945, 1958, and 1989, the Utah Supreme Court
specifically recognized a trial court's discretion to permit jurors to submit written questions
to witnesses. In 2002, Utah formalized the practice through adoption of rule 17(i), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in 2003, through adoption of rule 47(j), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, both of which grant the trial court discretion to accept, modify, or reject questions
by jurors.
Without acknowledging the existence of the Utah procedural rules or the array of
authority permitting the practice, defendant argues that this Court should overrule Utah
Supreme Court case precedent because permitting questions by jurors violates due process
in that it creates "role confusion" which "inherently prejudices" a defendant. Though the
argument has been commonly made, no court has ever accepted it. Indeed, no court has ever
concluded that permitting written questions by jurors violates any constitutional provision.
In sum, defendant has not established a reason to overrule Utah precedent or to question the
constitutionality of existing Utah rules.
This Court need not reach the merits of the issue, however, because defendant failed
to preserve a due process argument below and fails to meet briefing requirements on appeal.
Moreover, even if the issue were preserved and adequately presented, this Court has no

8

authority to overrule clear Utah Supreme Court precedent. In any case, the existing
procedural rule supersedes these prior cases.
ARGUMENT
UTAH PRECEDENT AND RULES GRANT A TRIAL COURT
DISCRETION TO PERMIT WRITTEN QUESTIONS BY JURORS
Since 1945, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized atrial court's authority to permit
questions by jurors in civil or criminal trials. See State v. Anderson, 158 P.2d 127, 134
(Utah 1945). Accord State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v.
Martinez, 326 P.2d 102, 103 (Utah 1958). In 2002, the practice was formalized with the
adoption of rule 17(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in 2003, with the adoption of
rule 47(j), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Add. A. Nevertheless, defendant claims he
was denied a fair trial because the jury submitted four written questions in this case, three of
which were ultimately asked of witnesses, and one of which was responded to by the trial
court. Defendant does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion in this case or even
that the specific questions prejudiced him. Rather, he claims that, as a matter of law,
permitting any questions by jurors violates due process and inherently harms a criminal
defendant (Br.Aplt. at 10 & 19). According to defendant, allowing jurors' questions allows
a juror "to elicit evidence and fill in any holes that are in the State's case [and, thus,] absolves
the prosecutor of its [sic] burden and the juror becomes the party that is producing evidence"
{Br.Aplt at 10). Similar challenges have been rejected by every court which has considered
them. See discussion, infra.

9

This Court need not reach the merits, however, because defendant has failed to meet
the requirements of rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in that he failed to preserve
his due process argument below, and on appeal, fails to fully disclose the trial record, to fully
acknowledge controlling authority, and to adequately brief the issue raised. Even if the due
process issue were properly preserved and presented, this Court has no authority to overrule
clear Utah Supreme Court precedent which permits the practice. In any case, the cases
defendant challenges have been superseded by procedural rule. Consequently, defendant's
appeal should be summarily rejected.
(A) The Merits Should Not Be Considered Because Defendant Has Failed
to Meet Preservation and Rule 24 Briefing Requirements,
'"As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a
constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed
plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances.5" State v. Richins, 2004 UT App
36, If 8, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App.
1993)). "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, i t . . . 'must be specifically raised to a level
of consciousness before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal
authority.'"/*/, (quoting State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, ^ 19, 58 P.3d 879).
Additionally, appellate courts will not consider an issue which has not been properly
and adequately briefed in compliance with rule 24(a)(9), which states that an appellant's brief
"shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statues and parts of the record relied on." See
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Add. A. "Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development
of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority . . . This court is not a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research. "
Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 379, % 20, 80 P.3d 546 (citing State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998)) (emphasis in original). Accord State v. Price, 827
P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah App. 1992). Here, defendant fails to meet these standards and,
consequently, the merits of his argument need not be considered.
Failure to Preserve. Below, defendant objected to the two questions submitted by the
jury for Tom Moore (R153: 133-34). The questions were (1) whether the loan was real and
(2) why did Tom borrow the down payment and seek the loan (id.). Defense counsel
objected, claiming that the substance of the questions had already been asked and answered
and that the questions were irrelevant to the case (id.). Defense counsel also objected on
constitutional grounds: "I've got the Sixth Amendment denied [sic] his right to (inaudible)
counsel to allow jurors to ask questions which may influence defense counsel's (inaudible)
that's improper at (inaudible) ask questions (R153: 134). See Add. B. The prosecutor
responded that she did not see how trial strategy was involved—the jury was simply confused
despite Tom's earlier testimony concerning the circumstances of the loan (R153: 134-35).
Defense counsel pointed out that if Tom were recalled, he could not testify that Rose Powers,
the loan officer, actually existed, but only that he spoke to someone purporting to be Ms.
Powers (R153: 135). See Add. B. Nothing in this exchange preserves defendant's current
due process claim—made pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments—that
11

permitting questions by jurors improperly allows them to fill in "holes in the State's case"
and "absolves the prosecutor of its burden" {Br.Aplt. at 10). Consequently, the argument is
waived.
Additionally, defendant claims that allowing the prosecutor to read the jurors'
questions to Tom "impermissibly connected] the prosecutor and the jury [and] allowed the
prosecutor to get inside the minds of the jurors" (Br.Aplt. at 14). Defendant, however, never
objected to this procedure below—only to the questions themselves (R153: 133-37). See
Add. B. Nor did defendant make any recorded objection to the subsequent questions
submitted in connection with the detective's testimony (R153: 191 & 194). Without a
specific objection below, defendant cannot now attack the method used in posing the jury's
questions to Tom or to either the questions or procedure used in connection with the
questions to the detective.
Failure to Fully Disclose Facts and Law: Defendant appears to folly disclose the
circumstances surrounding the questions posed by the jury and the court's ruling (Br.Aplt.
at 6-8). Closer inspection reveals that he has not. Defendant reproduces two pages of the
court's oral ruling, but omits any reference to the third page. Compare State's Statement of
the Facts, supra, and State ysAdd. B, with Br.Aplt. at 7-8. Defendant claims that he objected
to the questions posed to Tom Moore, but omits the page of the transcript (Rl 53:134), which
establishes that his objection was based only on a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Compare State's Add. B, with Br.Aplt. at 6. He fails to acknowledge that he made no
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recorded objections to the questions posed during the detective's testimony. Compare
State's Add. D, with Br.Aplt. at 8.
Similarly, defendant cites the three controlling Utah cases, which recognize a trial
court's discretion to permit questions by jurors. See Br.Aplt at 17-18 (citing Johnson, 784
P.2d 1135, Martinez, 326 P.2d 102, and Anderson, 158 P.2d 127). Yet, defendant fails to
acknowledge that two months prior to his trial, Utah formalized this practice with the
adoption of criminal rule 17(i). See discussion, infra, & Add. A. And eight months prior to
the submission of defendant's brief, Utah again approved of the practice when it adopted
civil rule 47(j), which is identical to rule 17(i). See text of rule 17(i), supra at 2, and the full
text of both rules, Add. A.
These omissions alone justify summary rejection of his claim.
Failure to Adequately Brief. A party who seeks to overrule precedent has '"a
substantial burden of persuasion' due to 'the doctrine of stare decisis.'" State v. Mauchley,
2003 UT 10, Tf 11, 67 P.3d 477 (quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994),
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995)). The party must examine historical development and
current law to show that the precedent is "no longer sound because of changed conditions."
Id. (other citation omitted). Or the party must establish that the precedent was "originally
erroneous" due to its inherent weaknesses. Id. Ultimately, the party must demonstrate that
"more good than harm will come by departing from precedent." Id. Here, defendant has not
attempted to meet this burden and, consequently, has not presented the legal analysis required
by rule 24(a)(9) for a Mauchley-Menzies argument.
13

As will be discussed, infra, defendant examines none of the historical or current
authorities, which overwhelmingly permit written questions by jurors. Nor does he
acknowledge that the few jurisdictions which limit the practice do so only on supervisory,
not constitutional grounds. See discussion, infra. Indeed, defendant cites no authority which
directly supports his due process challenge, but cites only cases considering due process in
other contexts (Br.Aplt. at 10-17). Given the wealth of authority and case law on questions
by jurors, defendant's presentation of only a generalized due process argument results in
inadequate analysis. Compare authorities cited, infra, with Br.Aplt. at 10-17.
Moreover, it is only in the last two pages of defendant's generalized argument that he
even acknowledges sixty years of Utah precedent which permits questions by jurors.
Compare discussion, infra, with Br.Aplt. at 17-18. But having acknowledge the controlling
case law, he analyzes it in the most cursory manner and summarizes his basis for overturning
it in one-paragraph (Br.Aplt. at 17-19). Most egregiously, he does not acknowledge—much
less analyze—the controlling criminal procedural rule, rule 17(i) (id.).
In sum, defendant's brief wholly fails to meet analytical requirements. Consequently,
it may be summarily rejected. In any case, even if defendant's challenge to the case
precedent were adequately presented, he does not attack rule 17(i), which otherwise permits
questions by jurors. Moreover, the argument is made in the wrong court: this Court has no
authority to overrule clear Utah Supreme Court precedent. See State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App
8,U21,84P.3d841.

14

In sum, this Court should not reach the merits of the due process claim because it was
not preserved below and is not properly or adequately presented on appeal.
(B) Defendant Has Not Established Any Basis to Question the Soundness
of Utah Precedent and Rule Which Permit Questions by Jurors,
If this Court, nevertheless, considers the merits, it will find that Utah precedent is
sound and rule 17(i) constitutionally permissible.
Defendant argues that permitting questions by jurors violates due process because it
permits jurors to "fill the holes" left by counsel's questions and "absolves" the prosecution
of its burden ofproof (Br.Aplt at 10). Defendant also claims that if the prosecutor is allowed
to ask the questions of the State's witnesses, it impermissibly connects the prosecutor with
the jury and allows the prosecutor "to get inside the minds of the jurors" (Br.Aplt. at 14).
Similar arguments have been rejected by every court which has considered them. See, e.g.,
Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1144-45 (rejecting due process challenge that questions by jurors
evidenced their premature deliberation of the case); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d
1078, 1086 (5th Cir.) (rejecting due process argument that questions by jurors "invade the
province of trial counsel and distort the proper roles of counsel, judge and jury"), cert,
denied, AAA U.S. 826 (1979); State v. Milligan, 11 P.3d 771, 777-78 (Colo. App.) (rejecting
due process claim that questions by jurors are inherently prejudicial and constitute structural
error); State v. Culkin, 35 P.3d 233, 255-56 (Haw. 2001) (rejecting due process claim that
jurors' questions render them impartial or impermissibly elicit prosecution evidence); State
v. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d 222, 226-30 (Ohio 2003) (rejecting due process challenge that juror
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questioning distorts the adversary system and recognizing that the argument rests on "the
erroneous premise that one must be passive to be impartial"); State v. Doleszny, 2004 VT 9,
Tf 20 & Tf 28-32 (rejecting due process challenge that questions by jurors eliminates the
prosecutor's burden of proof and noting the argument's false premise "that the burden of
proof must be met solely through the questions and actions of the prosecutor").
While some courts have imposed procedural safeguards on questions by jurors—and
some two to five states have prohibited the practice pursuant to their inherent supervisory
powers—no court has concluded that screened written questions by jurors violate any
constitutional provision. See Yeager v. Greene, 502 A.2d 980,986 n.15 (D.C. 1985) (noting
that "[t]he only cases where juror questioning of witnesses has resulted in reversal have
involved unsupervised in-court questions asked directly to the witness"); Martinez, 326 P.2d
at 103 (reversing for abuse of discretion where trial court permitted a jury to call and, without
restriction, directly question a witness, who neither party had called). See also Fisher, 789
N.E.2d at 226-28 (after exhaustively citing cases from "every federal circuit" and "the vast
majority of state courts," noting that only five jurisdictions prohibit jury questioning, but only
two view such questioning as "inherently prejudicial," but not as a matter of constitutional
law); Doleszny, 2004 VT 9, \ 12 (noting that "[ajlthough a few courts have prohibited
questioning of witnesses by juries, none have held it unconstitutional"); Culkin, 35 P.3d at
252-54 (same).
"Juror questioning is neither radical or a recent innovation. The practice was
historically part of the trial process and considered a useful tool in ascertaining the truth."
16

Doleszny, 2004 VT 9, % 12. As early as 1895, American courts permitted the practice.
Fisher, 789 N.E.2d at 226-27. Today, every federal circuit which has considered the issue
(ten of eleven circuits) and the vast majority of state jurisdictions recognize that a trial court,
in its discretion, may allow questions by jurors. See, e.g.y Milligan, 11 P.3d at 777-78
(providing overview of the wide-spread acceptance of questions by jurors in federal and state
courts); Culkin, 35 P.3d at 253-54 (same); State v. Hays, 883 P.2d 1093, 1098-99 (Kan.
1994) (same); Fisher, 789 N.E.2d at 226-28 (same). See also Carter v. State, 234 N.E.2d
650, 652 (Ind. 1968) (holding that it is error to prohibit a trial court from exercising its
discretion to permit questions by jurors, even if the practice should not be encouraged, and
citing Anderson, 158 P.2d 127, in support).
Moreover, the practice is approved by the American Bar Association and respected
commentators. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d at 226-30 (discussing recognition by American Bar
Association and social scientists that jurors' questions aids truth-finding, communication,
understanding, and confidence in the judgment by all participants); Doleszny, 2004 VT 9, ^
18 (recognizing that "scholarly and professional commentary is near unanimous in its support
of jurors submitting question for witnesses"). Accord Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086
(recognizing that jurors may need to submit clarifying questions because sometimes "counsel
are so familiar with a case they fail to see problems that would naturally bother a juror who
is presented with the facts for the first time").
Utah first sanctioned the practice in 1945. InAnderson, 158P.2dat 128-29, the Utah
Supreme Court found no error in the trial court inviting jurors to directly question witnesses.
17

Noting the general acceptance of questioning by jurors, the Utah court cautioned against
encouraging a jury to directly ask questions, but concluded that it was permissible "in the
sound discretion of the trial court" when "it will aid a juror in understanding some material
issue involved in the case and ordinarily when some juror has indicated that he wishes such
a point clarified." Id. In 1958, the supreme court again found the practice permissible, but
found an abuse of discretion where the trial court repeatedly encouraged jurors to directly
question witnesses and even invited them, "after retiring to deliberate, to question a witness
who had not been called by either prosecution or defense, resulting in an indiscriminate
posing of more than 50 questions." See Martinez, 326 P.2d at 103. But while condemning
the excesses in that case, the court reaffirmed Anderson's principle that a trial court had the
discretion to permit clarifying questions. See id. Most recently, in 1989, the supreme court
concluded that no error occurred when two jurors directly asked questions of a witness.
Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1144-45. Again, the supreme court did not encourage direct
questioning, but recognized its permissibility and found no harm where the questions were
merely for clarification. Id.
Utah formalized the practice of questions by jurors and imposed procedural safeguards
when it adopted criminal rule 17(i) in 2002 and civil rule 47(j) in 2003, both of which permit
questions by jurors in the discretion of the trial court. The rules, reproduced in their entirety
in Addendum A, recognize that a trial court, in its discretion, (1) may permit jurors to submit
written questions in connection with a witness's testimony, which (2) the court will then
screen to determine if the questions are acceptable, and (3) after considering any objections
18

of counsel, the court will decline, accept, or modify the questions, and then (4) the court will
either ask the question or have counsel ask the question and any follow-up questions, with
opposing counsel being given an opportunity to cross-examine. The current Utah rule
accords with sixty years of Utah precedent, and is consistent with a century of American
historical practice, the current practice in nearly every federal and state jurisdiction, and the
recommendations of the American Bar Association. See citations, supra. Here, though not
challenged by defendant, the court fully complied with the rule in permitting the questions.
In sum, defendant has established no basis to conclude that granting a trial court
discretion to consider questions by jurors violates due process.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions for forgery and theft should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A&^day of March, 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney Ge#efaT\

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the
cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the
addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief
where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the
appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of
the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under
paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow.
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments,
suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not
be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument
is arranged.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 47. Jurors.
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties
or their attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective
jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter
event, the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to
supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective
jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. Prior to examining the jurors,
the court may make a preliminary statement of the case. The
court may permit the parties or their attorneys to make a
preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in
advance of triaL
I (b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that alternate
jurors be impaneled. Alternate jurors, in the order*in which
they are called, shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the
jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualI ified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be selected
' at the same time and in the same manner, shall have the same
qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and
challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same
functions, powers, and privileges as principal jurors. An alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be
discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict unless
the parties stipulate otherwise and the court approves the
stipulation. The court may withhold from the jurors the
identity of the alternate jurors until the jurors begin deliberations. If one or two alternate jurors are called each party is
entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those
otherwise allowed.
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an
objection made to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to
the panel or (2) to an individual juror. Either party may
challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a
material departure from the forms prescribed in respect to the
drawing and return of the jury, or on the intentional omission
of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in
writing or be stated on the record, and must specifically set
forth the facts constituting the ground of challenge. If the
challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the jury so far
as the trial in question is concerned.
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory
challenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either
peremptory or for cause. Each party shall be entitled to three
peremptory challenges, except as provided under Subdivisions
(b) and (c) of this rule.
(f) Challenges for cause. A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard and deterniined by
the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be
| examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A
[challenge for cause may be taken on one or more of the
following grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a
juror upon the same grounds.
(f)(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law
i to render a person competent as a juror.

(f)(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to
either party, or to an officer of a corporation that is a party.
(f)(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, master and servant, employer and employee or
principal and agent, to either party, or united in business with
either party, or being on any bond or obligation for either
party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and creditor
shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a
tax, license fee, or service charge for water, power, light or
other services rendered to such resident.
(f)(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on
a previous trial between the same parties for the same cause
of action, or being then a witness therein.
(f)(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the
result of the action, or in the main question involved in the
action, except his interest as a member or citizen of a municipal corporation.
(f)(6) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is
not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if
challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and
will act impartially and fairly.
(g) Selection ofjury. The judge shall determine the method
of selecting the jury and notify the parties at a pretrial
conference or otherwise prior to trial. The following methods
for selection are not exclusive.
(g)(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon
the number of jurors that are to try the cause plus such an
additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all
peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for
cause that may be granted. At the direction of the judge, the
clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear
and determine challenges for cause during the course of
questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the
request of any party, shall hear and detennine challenges for
cause outside the hearing of the jurors. After each challenge
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the
vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause.
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall
provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning
with the plaintiff, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate
jurors, and the persons / whose names are so called shall
constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the
last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise
ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(g)(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number
of jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional
number as will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory
challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause that may
be granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call
jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine
challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the
end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party,
shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are
completed, the clerk shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, shall indicate
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or
waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining iurors, or so

many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury,
including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names
are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have
been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates,
unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(g)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in
random order by computer, the clerk may call the jurors in
that random order.
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath
must be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they
and each of them will well and truly try the matter in issue
between the parties, and a true verdict rendered according to
the evidence and the instructions of the court.
I (i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after impaneling
1
the jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform the duties of a juror and there is no alternate
juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the other jurors,
or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the
[parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and
the case shall be tried with a new jury.
(j) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit
written questions to a witness as provided in this section.
(j)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the
judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its
role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an
investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from
a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time,
judge should advise the jurors that they may write the
question as it occurs to them and submit the question to the
bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the
1
jurors that some questions might not be allowed. (
j (j)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and
unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the
question. The judge may disallow a question even though no
objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall
ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party
to ask it. The question may be rephrased into proper form. The
judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's question.
(k) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is
proper for the jury to have a view of the property which is the
subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact
occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under
thp charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to
them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose.
While the jury are thus absent no person other than the
person so appointed shall speak to them on any subject
rnrmpcted with the trial.
1^ (1) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during the trial or after the case is submitted to
jthem, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their
duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed
'by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the
case is finally submitted to them.
» (m) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted
to the jury they may decide in court or retire for deliberation.
If they retire they must be kept together in some convenient
place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict
or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Unless by order of the court, the officer having charge of them
must not make or allow to be made any communication to
them with respect to the action, except to ask them if they
have agreed upon their verdict, and the officer must not,
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the
state of deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.

(n) Exhibits taken by jury; notes. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take with them the instructions of the court
and all exhibits which have been received as evidence in the
cause, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the
court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of
unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit
the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to
take notes during the trial and to have those notes with them
during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall provide
jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking
and using notes.
(Q) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury haveretired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them
as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed
on any point of law arising in the cause, they may require the
officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought
.into court the information required must be given in the
presence of, or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such
[juiformation must be given in writing or stated on the record.
,r ,(p) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged
or prevented from giving a verdict for any reason, the action
shall be tried anew.
?i (q) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be
sealed. While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned
from time to time in respect to other business, but it shall be
open for every purpose connected with the cause submitted to
the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The
court mav direct the iurv to briner in a sealed verdict at the
opening ol the court, in case 01 an agreement during a recess
or adjournment for the day.
(r) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of
them, or such other number as may have been agreed upon by
the parties pursuant to Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict
they must be conducted into court, their names called by the
clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreperson; the verdict
must be in writing, signed by the foreperson, and must be read
by the clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is
their verdict. Either party may require the jury to be polled,
which shall be done by the court or clerk asking each juror if
it is the juror's verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is
an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury
must be sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and
the jury shall be discharged from the cause.
(s) Correction of verdict If the verdict rendered is informal
or insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice
of the court, or the jury may be sent out again.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 17* The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear*
and defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions:
(a)(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions,
defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence;
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death,
the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from
being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall
have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from
trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous,
riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
;
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court
and the consent of the prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the
defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to
trial, or the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in
the trial of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall
be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the
consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by
stipulation in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to
trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of
jurors less than otherwise required.
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial
shall proceed in the following order:
(g)(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(g)(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening
statement and the defense may make an opening statement or
reserve it until the prosecution has rested;
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the
charge;
(g)(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may
present its case;
(g)(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits;
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other
appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and
(g)(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either
side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall
open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. The
court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel
for each party and the time to be allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during
trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall
proceed using the alternate juror. If no alternate has been
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number
of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged
and a new trial ordered.

(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit
written questions to a witness as provided in this section.
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the
judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its
role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an
investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from
a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time.
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the
judge should advise the jurors that they may write the
question as it occurs to them and submit the question to the
bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the
jurors that some questions might not be allowed.
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and
unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the
question. The judge may disallow a question even though no
objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall
ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party
to ask it. The question may be rephrased into proper form. The
judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to exam^
ine the witness after the juror's question.
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury
to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it
may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of
an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some
person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer
shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will
suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak
to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the
trial and to return them-into court without unnecessary delay
iV
or at a specified time.
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are
permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among
themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and
that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon
until the case is finally submitted to them. (1) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with
them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have
been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in
the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such
as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court
shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are
entitled to take notes during the trial and to have those notes
with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on
taking and using notes.
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they
shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge
of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself,
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and
he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to
any person the state of their deliberations - or the verdict
agreed upon.
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire
to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they
shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that
the jury be brought before the court, where, in the presence of
the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without havingthe jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry
*™A fha rpsnnnsfi thereto shall be entered in the record.

(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face,
it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court,
or the jury may be sent out again.
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or
at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an
order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count
thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser
included offense.
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•

THE COUR n
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Go aheai, I woi if I
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I've got the Sixth Amendment denied his right to
(Inaudible) counsel to allow jurors to ask questions
which may influence defense counsel's (Inaudible) that's
improper at (Inaudible) ask questions.
Number two, I object to the question —

both

of them have been asked and answered.
Number three, they're irrelevant as to the
fact —

issues in this case, in any event.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

Ms. Beaton, you may respond.
MS. BEATON:

I don't see how answering --

presumably we're talking about the second question right
now.

It's a situation where it would really involve

trial strategy.

We have a situation where either one or

two jurors are confused about what has taken place.

I

don't see why I can't re-enter this evidence from Mr.
Moore, or in my (Inaudible) refer them back to evidence
that has already been provided in order to answer their
questions.
And I don't think as to the other question it
has actually been asked or answered, as to whether or
not Rose Powers actually -- the original ruling with
regard to Tom Moore talking about the fact that he had
made a call there and talked to her in return, that she
had never received the money.

At that time, Moore was
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At this point in my career, until I fe'el
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them to ask questions.
Having said that, however, I have a
responsibility to make sure that this case on both
is fairly tried.

sides

And if an issue is ambiguous, so ~hat

the fact finder is not certain about facts, whether they
appear particularly relevant to us or not, but at least
allow them to understand the case better, then

I'm

constrained to allow them to ask the question and to
answer it.
And while I won't invite them to ask
questions, if they send me a note on their own, wanting
something to be answered, then I'm going to allow them
to do it.

And we can do it one of two ways.

We can

send the note back in to them, which I only like doing
after they're deliberating, or we put them back on the
stand, a witness, and you will have in front of you both
of these questions.

And all I ask, so that we don't

offer a lot of cumulative evidence and replow the ground
again, that we very specifically, very pointedly ask in
effect the jury's question and elicit that evidence.
I'm going to then give you a chance, Mr.
Gravis, to cross examine, so that at least there's been
direct examination, cross examination, if necessary
redirect examination and recross examination on
issue that the jury has asked.

And then I'll

any

just let
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okay?
BEATON:

Okay.

20

THE COURT:

21

(Conclusion of in-chamber conference and

22 I parties returned
23 j

Thanks.

to the courtroom.)

THE COURT 1

Before we begin, this has no thing

2
2 5 j management of my courtroom

^ 1:1 i :i 1: 1 g
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We've been i 11 this bui 1 ding
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Addendum C

Mr . H r a v i s i s si f I i n«i a 1" , r m t
2

one

4

' ne w i t h

another.
0 N I D E N TI!? ' IE1) S P E A K EI '
THE COURT:

;,:.•

Okay,

MS. BEATON:
.c;

at tnis

nere we go.

Okay.

o±d~;-s th^t they were

(11 i a u d i b 1 e ) .

_ _ _:ii.::_ that probably

..iow. • Okay r

h

8 i

'-^^ f *-<=> " -

The Judge had indicated to

(Inaudible) questions " i .TO

Lime, J. m goi ng to recall Mr. Moor

he can clarify some

... those questions.

TOM1 MOORE,
< | called as a witness here, having been previous! y sworn
I i i

| M ' 11 K

| i i

I 111

I

II

, i

] »

^/diiiiiii

J

i j 11 I

1 i s I J I i h

I

1.)

follows:

D IRECT
Bf MS .
,i

BEATOH

EXAMINATION

.

Q^

Agaix,, J ^ S L for the record, please state your

A.

Tom Moore.

^,

Okay.

name .

j-.r." ~;s you :; : i already been
A .

.. .

worn :n :

:hj

"lerk.

:f(!i j; ; .

ftiss

_
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1

Q.

2
3

One of the questions that we received was:
"Does the loan officer exist in Canada?"

4
5

Okay.

Did you actually speak to somebody who worked
for the company in Canada?

6

A.

Yes, Rose Powers.

7

Q.

Okay.

8
9

MR. GRAVIS:
witness?

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. BEATON:

12

MR. GRAVIS:

MS. BEATON:

19
20
21
22

I'm going to object unless ha has

Well, I think it's a foundational

issue and I'd ask that I be allowed to (Inaudible).

17
18

If I could just have an

personal knowledge of these people (Inaudible).

15
16

You may.

opportunity to develop --

13
14

And I -- may I voir dire the

THE COURT:

I'll let you lay your foundation

and then you can voir dire the witness.
Q.

BY MS. BEATON:

What number did you use to

call this company?
A.

It was an 800 number.

I don't know the number

offhand, off of memory.

23

Q.

Where did you get the number?

24

A.

Out of a business magazine.

25

Q.

What's the name of the company?
_ _ _ _ ~

XI •

-L- U

»as some kind ox consult —
r

company
\ ii

11 ' I

~

VV

iI

_.

i-

.

0,

Win n you called the company/- did you ask to

: ,

Ye s ,

Q,

A n d di d a f e m a l e

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have

1J

£#.

N o , I haven

11

n

Was there ever any discussion that that

12

I d :i d
answer

you ever actually
f

the phone

met Rose

there?

Powers?

t.

perso~, Rose rowe '
A,

No.
] f , r i Ei t: 1 i = r :i i l Cai la la ?

' ).

AQ.
A n d that w^ 3 t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n
-Loay
i i 3 3 Rose
A.

t*hat- y w j

ilQa

.. J „ , _...;.... ;. _ £ M . h e m s e l v e s

Powers?
Correct.
Okay.
Now,

^^

to be familiar with the app 1 1 c at i oi I p i ocess 11: Iat ;;: , • : i

° / ' ilrc~iy
^o i

j n talking to this person, did she seem

discussed?
~T

- . c:
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Union and the money was not there.
Q.

Okay.
In talking with her, did you originally talk

to her at any point in time prior to discovering that
there was possibly a problem with this transaction,
after you actually went over to the Western Union
office?
A.

No, I hadn't.

Q.

Okay.
And I think what you indicated earlier is that

you believed that the defendant had already talked to
Rose Powers?
A.

Yeah, before I wired the money.

Q.

Okay.
And in speaking with the defendant, did he

identify the loan officer or the person that he was
dealing with by the name of Rose Powers?
A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

Okay.
And is that the way that you knew who to call

at the company?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Because at the time that you made your call,

did you have any of the paperwork then from the wire
25 I transfer?
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™

assuming ^^ the Western Union,

'uui. y^u still had to borrow mone And so maybe we n-e 1 r >
wd^> m e
A.

~

4

*:

When

?

jhat

?

:e Dt consolidation.

Q-

i li

A

"

Q.
\I

reas- r

=.ck • :•> .

I i I MI

h ! v ii ixp-jij L L
'

"

]et?

-

.:. _i *. . oan w.

=inw

-f : roperty or a heme - r anything of that: nature?
A.
• _

-;n .
Okay.

What is the reason, then, that y ~ u decided
that you would go out and borrow tne c y: -<

'

- i

origination fee of $825 i n order •*• * get * his loan?
A.

o 1 11 i d

d t: : •
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refinance my house while the interest rates were lower.
Q.

Okay,

A.

And, you know, take care of some bills I had.

Q.

Did you plan on using the $10,000 loan also to

pay off the person who gave the initial money to you in
order to get this loan?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

If you originally did not have the $825 that

you needed in order to get this loan, what's the reason
that you decided that it would be a good idea to borrow
it from somebody else?
A.

Well, she was staying at my house and, you

know, I was just helping her out, too, kind of like I
was him.

And so she had some money and she says, "Well,

if you can do that, then we can get the lower payment on
the house going," because my mortgage payment was
killing me at the time.
Q.

How much was your mortgage payment at the

A*

It was 750 and then it was going to balloon to

time?

850.

It was on a weird kind of a rate and with the

mortgage rates dropping at that time, you know, I
figured well, if I refinance, I can drop my monthly
payment substantious -- you know, and save some money.
Q.

So this woman who decided to loan you the
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A,

Yeahf
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Q.
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I J

a

Correct.

12

\J*

A n d d o y o u s t i l l o w e t h i s l o a n iu

13

of y o u r s w v c o r i g i n a l l y

;

'

loaned you the money?

14
1" !

X d o i if 1 : t h i n k I h a v e a. n y f u r t h e r

M S . B E A T;. N i
q u e s t :i oi is .

CRQS S EXAMIMATION
- !

BY MR.

GRAVIS:
Q.

thev

Mi ' i1

i' 11 i

i

iJrJ L a u t e d

Wester n Union

tell j--.!-. til::: L : y o u f i l e d a p o l i c e r e p o r t

didn ' t

they

. ._ ] n e v e r t-he f r a u d ?
A.

They

actually had told me originairy

2 4 I t h o u g h t t h e y w o u l d b e a b l e to do
25

gi ve n me a - - c : : g i i =

Liiey

t h e y shoi; 1 o n !:
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1:1 i

would issue one to m e .

And then they told m e , "No, you

have to get ahold of the police department,"
Q.

So you called the police

department?

A,

Correct.

Q.

And you say you're still in

(Inaudible)

Western Union?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Now, did you ever fill out any loan

application papers?
A.
off.

No, I didn't.

It was that I would send that

Steven was handling that for the loan.

It was

dumb on my part, yes.
MR. GRAVIS:

Nothing further.

M S . BEATON:

I have no further questions.

THE COURT:
M S . BEATON:
THE COURT:

Any further questions?
No.
All right, you may step down.

Thank you.
MS. BEATON:

The state now calls Karen Smith.

KAREN SMITH,
called as a witness here, having been duly

sworn

by the clerk to speak to the truth, was examined and
testified as follows:
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Addendu;
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1

MS. BEATON:

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. BEATON:

I have no further questions,
Would you like me

And move for what's been marked

4

as State's Exhibit 5 be admitted.

5

admission also of State's Exhibit No. 6.

6

MR. GRAVIS:

7

—

And I'd move for

May we approach the bench, Your

Honor?

8

THE COURT:

9

(Whereupon, a side-bar conference was held.)

10

M S . BEATON:

Yes.

Okay.

And just for the record,

11

at this point, this Exhibit No. 6 (Inaudible) 5, 1, 2, 3

12

and 4 have been admitted.

13

(State's Exhibit No. 6 received into

14

evidence.)

15

Q.

BY M S . BEATON:

Detective Reaves, there was a

16

question that came in from the jury that indicates, "If

17

a forgery was involved, why didn't Detective Reaves"

18

it says

19

Western Union signature?"

—

(Inaudible) but it's Reaves -- "question the

20

So why didn't you question the defendant about

21

the signature on the Western Union form?

22

A.

I'm not sure which signature would be in

23

question.

24

so many forms on that I'm not sure which one would b e . . .

25

Q.

I

I'm not understanding the question.

There's

In this particular case, Tom Moore's name is

F»tB^
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signed on three different —

in three different areas.

A*

Okay.

Q.

You talked to him a little bit about the

question when they're sending the money, there's a
reference, and the defendant claims he had permission
from Tom to sign that.
A.

Okay.

Q.

And we've talked about that.

There is also a

signature that you talked about on the check itself in
order to get the refund.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

You talked to the defendant about that.

believe the question is:
defendant about this —

I

Why didn't you talk to the
this signature right here, that

was filled out in conjunction with the refund form from
Western Union?
A.

You know, I believe that you actually did ask

me something about that.

I can't honestly sit here and

testify that I didn't put it in the statement I had with
Mr. Manchester and it's not in my case (Inaudible).

And

because of the time length, I cannot tell you that I
specifically asked him about that or not, and I don't
want to give the wrong impression either way.

And so I

hope that answers the question.
Q.

Is your answer, then, you did not discuss with
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him what's been marked as State's Exhibit 2, that
particular
A.

signature?
What my answer is, I could not honestly —

I

would assume that I would have, but when I go down to
the specific questioning and the answering, I did not
put it in here.

Most likely, as I would do in every

case, did you do this, did you do this, did you do this,
(Inaudible) down there, I did not bring it to this
statement about that particular signature.
Q.

Is there any reason why you

State's Exhibit No. 4
A.

(Inaudible) marked

(Inaudible)?

Well, because the way I view this here, this

is the transaction that actually made the theft, that
actually made the forgery itself.

In other words, if it

wasn't for this signature here in the back and here, Mr.
Manchester would not have received the $825.
signing

By simply

(Inaudible) the fees does not necessarily

him the money.

give

This is the actual money transaction,

which is the actual check which is issued out to Mr.
Moore and Mr. Moore's signature is not —

the proper

signature is not on here and that's the one that he was
admitting to.
Q.

Okay.

A.

So that was probably a lower thing or —

to

me, maybe I didn't understand it correctly, but that
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tied in exactly to -- that created a refund where this
is actually the one

that created the refund.

Q.

The check itself?

A.

The check itself, yes.

Q.

Okay.
M S . BEATON:

I don't have any further

questions of this witness.
THE COURT:

Will both the lawyers approach for

just a minute, please.
(Whereupon, a side-bar conference was held.)
THE COURT:

Members of the jury, one of your

members passed the Court a note with this question:
"How did Steven Manchester manage to cash the check
without Tom Moore's identification?"
The testimony was that this check could be
cashed with one of two ways, either with an
identification or having the original receipt that had
the test question.

And the evidence is that he used

the -MR. GRAVIS:
check

Let the person who cashed the

(Inaudible) .
THE COURT:

That's right.

The person who had

the -- who cashed the check had the original receipt
with the test question.
MS. BEATON:

With that, I'm done questioning
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Detective Reaves.
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS;

You may cross examine, Mr. Gravis.
Thank you, Your Honor,

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q.

Okay.

Now, when you first got assigned this

case, you got a report from the initial officer who
handled it; right?
A.

I did, sir.

Q.

Would that be A. Silva?

A.

I'd have to look at the —

I don't have the

—

I have my report up here but I don't have the original.
Q.

(Mr. Gravis hands he report to the witness.)

A.

Yes, sir, it is.

Q.

Okay.
You reviewed that report before you ever

talked to Mr. Moore; correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.
Now, when you talked to Mr. Moore, you've read

the report, he tells you that he discovered this alleged
forgery and theft a couple of days later, when he talked
to the defendant?
A.

Well, if you get this -- where are you
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